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ABSTRACT
Blockchain-based consensus protocols present the opportunity to
develop new protocols, due to their novel requirements of open
participation and explicit incentivization of participants. To address
the first requirement, it is necessary to consider the leader election
inherent in consensus protocols, which can be difficult to scale to
a large and untrusted set of participants. To address the second, it
is important to consider ways to provide incentivization without
relying on the resource-intensive proofs-of-work used in Bitcoin.
In this paper, we propose a secure leader election protocol, Caucus;
we next fit this protocol into a broader blockchain-based consensus
protocol, Fantômette, that provides game-theoretic guarantees in
addition to traditional blockchain security properties. Fantômette
is the first proof-of-stake protocol to give formal game-theoretic
proofs of security in the presence of non-rational players.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the central components of any distributed system is a con-
sensus protocol, by which the system’s participants can agree on its
current state and use that information to take various actions. Con-
sensus protocols have been studied for decades in the distributed
systems literature, and classical protocols such as Paxos [37] and
PBFT [20] have emerged as “gold standards” of sorts, in terms of
their ability to guarantee the crucial properties of safety and live-
ness even in the face of faulty or malicious nodes.
The setting of blockchains has renewed interest in consensus pro-
tocols, due largely to two crucial new requirements: scalability and
incentivization. First, classical consensus protocols were designed
for a closed and relatively small set of participants, whereas in open
(or “permissionless”) blockchains the goal is to enable anyone to
join. This requires the design of new consensus protocols that can
both scale to handle a far greater number of participants, and also
ones that can address the question of Sybil attacks [24], due to the
fact that participants may no longer be well identified.
At heart, one of the biggest obstacles in scaling classical consen-
sus protocols is in scaling their underlying leader election protocol,
in which one participant or subset of participants is chosen to lead
the decisions around what information should get added to the
ledger for a single round (or set period of time). To elect a leader,
participants must coordinate amongst themselves by exchanging
several rounds of messages. If a Sybil is elected leader, this can
result in the adversary gaining control over the ledger, and if there
are too many participants then the exchange of messages needed
to carry out the election may become prohibitively expensive.
Many recent proposals for blockchain-based consensus protocols
focus on solving this first requirement by presenting more scalable
leader election protocols [12, 22, 31, 46].
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The second novel requirement of blockchains is the explicit
economic incentivization on behalf of participants. In contrast to
classical consensus protocols, where it is simply assumed that some
set of nodes is interested in coming to consensus, in Bitcoin this
incentivization is created through the use of block rewards and
transaction fees. Again, several recent proposals have worked to
address this question of incentives [7, 33, 43, 45, 56]. Typically, how-
ever, the analysis of these proposals has focused on proving that
following the protocol is a Nash equilibrium (NE), which captures
the case of rational players but not ones that are Byzantine (i.e.,
fully malicious).
Indeed, despite these advances, one could argue that the only
consensus protocol to fully address both requirements is still the
one underlying Bitcoin, which is typically known as Nakamoto
or proof-of-work (PoW)-based consensus. This has in fact been
proved secure [28, 44], but provides Sybil resistance only by requir-
ing enormous amounts of computational power to be expended.
As such, it has also been heavily criticized for the large amount of
electricity that it uses. Furthermore, it has other subtle limitations;
e.g., it does not achieve any notion of fully deterministic finality
and some attacks have been found on its incentive scheme [18, 52].
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose Fantômette, a new
blockchain-based consensus protocol that fully incorporates an in-
centive design to prove security properties in a settings that consid-
ers both rational and Byzantine adversaries. Our initial observation
is that the PoW-based setting contains an implicit investment on
the part of the miners, in the form of the costs of hardware and
electricity. In moving away from PoW, this implicit investment no
longer exists, giving rise to new potential attacks due to the fact that
creating blocks is now costless. It is thus necessary to compensate
by adding explicit punishments into the protocol for participants
whomisbehave. This is difficult to do in a regular blockchain setting.
In particular, blockchains do not reveal information about which
other blocks miners may have been aware of at the time they pro-
duced their block, so they cannot be punished for making “wrong”
choices. We thus move to the setting of blockDAGs [53, 54], which
induce a more complex fork-choice rule and expose more of the
decision-making process of participants. Within this model, we are
able to leverage the requirement that players must place security
deposits in advance of participating in the consensus protocol to
achieve two things. First, we can implement punishments by taking
away some of the security deposit, and thus incentivize rational
players to follow the protocol. Second, because this allows the play-
ers to be identified, we can provide a decentralized checkpointing
system, which in turn allows us to achieve a notion of finality.
Along the way, we present in Section 5 a leader election protocol,
Caucus, that is specifically designed for open blockchains, and that
we prove secure in a model presented in Section 4. We then use
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Caucus as a component in the broader Fantômette consensus proto-
col, which we present in Section 6 and argue for the security of in
Section 7. Here we rely on Caucus to address the first requirement
of scaling in blockchain-based consensus protocols, so can focus
almost entirely on the second requirement of incentivization.
In summary, we make the following concrete contributions: (1)
we present the design of a leader election protocol, Caucus. In ad-
dition to provably satisfying more traditional notions of security,
Caucus has several “bonus” properties; e.g., it ensures that leaders
are revealed only when they take action, which prevents them from
being subject to the DoS attacks possible when their eligibility is
revealed ahead of time. (2) we present the design and simulation of a
full blockchain-based consensus protocol, Fantômette, that provides
a scheme for incentivization that is robust against both rational and
fully adaptive Byzantine adversaries. Fantômette is compatible with
proof-of-stake (PoS), but could also be used for other “proof-of-X”
settings with an appropriate leader election protocol.
2 RELATED
The work that most closely resembles ours is the cryptographic
literature on proof-of-stake (PoS). We evaluate and compare each
protocol along the two requirements outlined in the introduction of
scalability and incentivization. Other non-academic work proposes
PoS solutions [1, 3, 34], which is related to Fantômette in terms of
the recurrent theme of punishment in the case of misbehavior.
In Ouroboros [33], the honest strategy is a δ -Nash equilibrium,
which addresses the question of incentives. The leader election,
however, is based on a coin-tossing scheme that requires a rela-
tively large overhead. This is addressed in Ouroboros Praos [22],
which utilizes the same incentive structure but better addresses the
question of scalability via a more efficient leader election proto-
col (requiring, as we do in Caucus, only one broadcast message to
prove eligibility). A recent improvement, Ouroboros Genesis [10],
allows for dynamic availability; i.e., allows offline parties to safely
bootstrap the blockchain when they come back online.
A comparable protocol is Algorand [31], which proposes a scal-
able Byzantine agreement protocol and the use of a “cryptographic
sortition” leader election protocol, which resembles Caucus. They
do not address the question of incentives.
In Snow White [12], the incentive structure is based on that of
Fruitchains [45], where honest mining is a NE resilient to coali-
tions. The incentive structure of Thunderella [46] is also based on
Fruitchains, but is PoW-based.
Casper [17] is still work in progress, so it is difficult to say how
well it addresses scalability. On the topic of incentivization, it pro-
poses that following that protocol should be a Nash equilibrium
and that an attacker should lose more in an attack than the victims
of the attack. A closely related recent paper is Hot-Stuff [6], which
proposes a PBFT-style consensus protocol that operates in an asyn-
chronous model. Again, this paper does not address incentivization.
Among other types of consensus protocols, there are several that
do closely consider the topic of incentivization. The first version of
Solidus [7], which is a consensus protocol based on PoW, provides
a (k, t)-robust equilibrium for any k + t < f , although they leave
a rigorous proof of this for future work. SpaceMint [43] is a cryp-
tocurrency based on proof-of-space, and they prove that following
the protocol is a Nash equilibrium. In terms of protocols based on
PoW, SPECTRE [53] introduced the notion of a blockDAG, which
was further refined by PHANTOM [54]. Our Fantômette protocol is
inspired by PHANTOM (although translated to a non-PoW setting),
and in particular we leverage the notion of connectivity of blocks in-
duced by blockDAGs. Avalanche [2], a recent proposal also relying
on blockDAG, but in the context of PoS, recently appeared. They
propose a PBFT-style consensus protocol that achieves O(kn) for
some k ≪ n, and is thus more expensive than Caucus that requires
a single message broadcast. They do not consider the question of
incentives.
In terms of economic analyses, Kroll et al. [36] studied the eco-
nomics of PoW and showed that following the protocol is a NE.
Badertscher et al [9] analyze Bitcoin in the Rational Protocol Design
setting. The “selfish mining” series of attacks [26, 38, 52] show that
the incentive structure of Nakamoto consensus is vulnerable. Carl-
sten et al. [18] also consider an attack on the incentives in Bitcoin,
in the case in which there are no block rewards. Recently, Gaži et
al. [29] proposed an attack on PoS protocols that we address here.
Beyond the blockchain setting, Halpern [32] presents new per-
spectives from game theory that go beyond Nash equilibria in terms
of analyzing incentive structures. One of this concept comes from
Abraham et al. [5], which we use in Section 3.4.
To summarize, most existing proposals for non-PoW blockchain
consensus protocols provide a basic game-theoretic analysis, us-
ing techniques like Nash equilibria, but do not consider more ad-
vanced economic analyses that tolerate coalitions or the presence
of Byzantine adversaries. Fantômette is thus the first one to place
incentivization at the core of its security. In terms of scalability, our
protocol is again different as it is not based on a BFT-style algo-
rithm, but is rather inspired by Nakamoto consensus (leveraging
its economic element).
3 BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS AND
NOTATION
In this section, we present the underlying definitions we rely on in
the rest of the paper. We begin (Sections 3.1-3.2) with the crypto-
graphic notation and primitives necessary for our leader election
protocol, Caucus.
3.1 Preliminaries
If S is a finite set then |S | denotes its size and x $← S denotes sam-
pling a member uniformly from S and assigning it to x . λ ∈ N
denotes the security parameter and 1λ denotes its unary represen-
tation.
Algorithms are randomized unless explicitly noted otherwise.
PT stands for polynomial time. By y ← A(x1, . . . ,xn ;R) we de-
note running algorithm A on inputs x1, . . . ,xn and random coins
R and assigning its output to y. By y $← A(x1, . . . ,xn ) we de-
note y ← A(x1, . . . ,xn ;R) for R sampled uniformly at random.
By [A(x1, . . . ,xn )] we denote the set of values that have non-zero
probability of being output by A on inputs x1, . . . ,xn . Adversaries
are algorithms. We denote non-interactive algorithms using the
font Alg, and denote interactive protocols using the font Prot. We
further denote such protocols as outputs $← Prot(1λ ,P, inputs),
where the i-th entry of inputs (respectively, outputs) is used to
2
denote the input to (respectively, output of) the i-th participant.
We say that two probability ensembles X and Y are statistically
close over a domainD if 12
∑
α ∈D |Pr[X = α]−Pr[Y = α]| is negligi-
ble; we denote this as X ≈ Y . Verifiable Random Functions (VRF),
first introduced by Micali et al. [39], generate a pseudo-random
number in a publicly verifiable way. Formally, a VRF is defined as
follows:
Definition 3.1. A VRF consists in three polynomial-time algo-
rithm (Gen,Prove,Verify) that works as follows: (1) Gen(1λ) out-
puts a key pair (pk, sk); (2)Provesk (x) outputs a pair (y = Gsk (x),p =
psk (x)); (3) Verify(x ,y,p) verifies that y = Gsk (x) using p. An VRF
satisfies correctness if:
• if (y,p) = Provesk (x) then Verify(x ,y,p) = 1
• for every (sk,x) there is a uniquey such thatVerify(x ,y,psk (x)) =
1
• it verifies pseudo-randomness: for any PPT algorithm A =
(AE ,AJ ):
P

(pk, sk ) ← Gen(1λ );
b = b′ (x, Ast ) ← AProve(.)E (pk );
y0 = Gsk (x );y1 ← {0, 1}len(G);
b ← {0, 1};b′ ← AProve(.)J (yb, Ast )

≤ 12 + neдl (k )
3.2 Coin tossing and random beacons
Coin tossing is closely related to leader election [11], and allows two
or more parties to agree on a single or many random bits [11, 13, 47];
i.e., to output a value R that is statistically close to random. A
coin-tossing protocol must satisfy liveness, unpredictability, and
unbiasability [55], where we define these (in keeping with our
definitions for leader election in Section 4) as follows:
Definition 3.2. Let fA be the fraction of participants controlled by
an adversary A. Then a coin-tossing protocol satisfies fA -liveness
if it is still possible to agree on a random value R even in the face
of such an A.
Definition 3.3. A coin-tossing protocol satisfies unpredictability
if, prior to some step barrier in the protocol, no PT adversary can
produce better than a random guess at the value of R.
Definition 3.4. A coin-tossing protocol is fA -unbiasable if for all
PT adversaries A controlling an fA fraction of participants, the
output R is still statistically close to a uniformly distributed random
string.
A concept related to coin tossing is random beacons. These were
first introduced by Rabin [48] as a service for “emitting at regularly
spaced time intervals, randomly chosen integers”. To extend the
above definitions to random beacons, as inspired by [15], we require
that the properties of fA-liveness and fA-unbiasability apply for
each iteration of the beacon, or round. We also require that the
barrier in the unpredictability definition is at least the beginning
of each round.
3.3 Blockchains
Distributed ledgers, or blockchains, have become increasingly pop-
ular ever since Bitcoin was first proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2008 [40]. Briefly, individual Bitcoin users wishing to pay other
users broadcast transactions to a global peer-to-peer network, and
the peers responsible for participating in Bitcoin’s consensus pro-
tocol (i.e., for deciding on a canonical ordering of transactions)
are known as miners. Miners form blocks, which contain (among
other things that we ignore for ease of exposition) the transactions
collected since the previous block was mined, which we denote
txset, a pointer to the previous block hashhprev, and a proof-of-work
(PoW). This PoW is the solution to a computational puzzle. If future
miners choose to include this block by incorporating its hash into
their own PoW then it becomes part of the global blockchain. A
fork is created if two miners find a block at the same time. Bitcoin
follows the longest chain rule, meaning that whichever fork creates
the longest chain is the one that is considered valid.
BlockDAGs. As the name suggests, a blockchain is a chain of
blocks, with each block referring to only one previous block. In
contrast, a blockDAG [53, 54], is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of
blocks. In our paper (which slightly adapts the original definitions),
every block still specifies a single parent block, but can also reference
other recent blocks of which it is aware. These are referred to as
leaf blocks, as they are leaves in the tree (also sometimes referred
as the tips of the chain), and are denoted Leaves(G). Blocks thus
have the form B = (Bprev,Bleaf ,π , txset) where Bprev is the parent
block, Bleaf is a list of previous leaf blocks, π is a proof of some type
of eligibility (e.g., a PoW), and txset is the transactions contained
within the block. We denote by B.snd the participant that created
block B. In addition, we define the following notation:
• G denotes a DAG, Gi the DAG according to a participant i , and G
the space of all possible DAGs.
• In a block, Bprev is a direct parent of B, and Ancestors(B) denotes
the set of all blocks that are parents of B, either directly or indi-
rectly.
• A chain is a set of blocksM such that there exists one block B
for whichM = Ancestors(B).
• Past(B) denotes the subDAG consisting of all the blocks that B
references directly or indirectly.
• DirectFuture(B) denotes the set of blocks that directly reference
B (i.e., that include it in Bleaf ).
• Anticone(B) denotes the set of blocks B′ such that B′ < Past(B)
and B < Past(B′).
• d denotes the distance between two blocks in the DAG.
• The biggest common prefix DAG (BCPD) is the biggest subDAG
that is agreed upon by more than 50% of the players.
For example, if we consider the blockDAG in Figure 1, we have
that Ancestors(H ) = {E,A, genesis} and {H ,E,A, genesis} forms
a chain. We also have that DirectFuture(F ) = {H , I }, Past(H ) =
{E, F ,A,B,C, genesis}, Anticone(E) = {D,G, I }, and d(A,H ) = 2.
Proof-of-stake. By its nature, PoW consumes a lot of energy.
Thus, some alternative consensus protocols have been proposed
that are more cost-effective; arguably the most popular of these is
called proof-of-stake (PoS) [4, 34, 56]. If we consider PoW to be a
leader election protocol in which the leader (i.e., the miner with
the valid block) is selected in proportion to their amount of compu-
tational power, then PoS can be seen as a leader election protocol
in which the leader (i.e., the participant who is eligible to propose a
new block) is selected in proportion to some “stake” they have in
the system (e.g. the amount of coins they have).
3
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Figure 1: Example of a blockDAG. A full arrow indicates a bet (Bprev)
and a dashed arrow indicates a reference (Bleaf ).
As security no longer stems from the fact that it is expensive
to create a block, PoS poses several technical challenges [21]. The
main three are as follows: first, the nothing at stake problem says
that miners have no reason to not mine on top of every chain, since
mining is costless, so it is more difficult to reach consensus. This is
an issue of incentives that, as we present in Section 6, Fantômette
aims to solve. We do so by giving rewards to players that follow the
protocol and punishing players who mine on concurrent chains.
Second, PoS allows for grinding attacks [21], in which once a
miner is elected leader they privately iterate through many valid
blocks (again, because mining is costless) in an attempt to find one
that may give them an unfair advantage in the future (e.g., make
them more likely to be elected leader). This is an issue that we
encounter in Section 5 and address using an unbiasable source of
randomness.
Finally, in a long-range attack, an attacker may bribe miners
into selling their old private keys, which would allow them to re-
write the entire history of the blockchain. Such a “stake-bleeding”
attack [29] can be launched against PoS protocols that adopt a
standard longest chain rule and do not have some form of check-
pointing. We solve this problem in Fantômette by adding a notion
of finality, in the form of decentralized checkpointing.
3.4 Game-theoretic definitions
In game-theoretic terms, we consider the consensus protocol as a
game in infinite extensive-form with imperfect information [49],
where the utilities depend on the state of the blockDAG.A blockchain-
consensus game theoretically has an infinite horizon, but here we
consider a finite horizon of some length T unknown to the players.
Following our model (which we present in Section 4), we assume
that at each node in the game tree player i is in some local state that
includes their view of the blockDAG and some private information.
Following Abraham et al. [5], we consider the following frame-
work. With each run of the game that results in a blockDAG G, we
associate some utility with player i , denoted ui (G). A strategy for
player i is a (possibly randomized) function from i’s local state to
some set of actions, and tells the player what to do at each step. A
joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no player can gain any advan-
tage by using a different strategy, given that all the other players
do not change their strategies. An extension of Nash equilibria
is coalition-proof Nash equilibria [5]. A strategy is k-resilient if a
coalition of up to a fraction of k players cannot increase their utility
function by deviating from the strategy, given that other players
follow the strategy. A strategy is t-immune if, even when a group
that comprises a fraction t of the players deviate arbitrarily from
the protocol, the payoff of the non-deviating players is greater than
or equal to their payoff in the case where these players do not devi-
ate. A strategy is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium if it is a k-resilient and
t-immune equilibrium. Similarly, in an ϵ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium,
players cannot increase their utility by more than ϵ by deviating
from the protocol or decrease their utility by more than 1/ϵ in the
presence of a fraction of t irrational players.
In addition to the players, we assume there exist some other
agents that do not participate in the game but still maintain a view
of the blockDAG. These passive agents represent full node, and
will not accept blocks that are clearly invalid. The existence of
these agents allows us to assume in Section 7 that even adversarial
players must create valid blocks.
4 MODELLING BLOCKCHAIN CONSENSUS
We present in this section a model for blockchain-based consensus,
run amongst a set of participants (also called players) P. A block B
is considered to be a bet on its ancestors Ancestors(B). After intro-
ducing the assumptions we make about participants, we present a
model for leader election, which is used to determine which par-
ticipants are eligible to create a block. We then present a model
for overall blockchain-based consensus, along with its associated
security notions.
4.1 Assumptions
We consider a semi-synchronous model [25] where time is divided
in units called slots, and each message is delivered within a maxi-
mum delay of ∆ slots (for ∆ unknown to participants). We assume
that all players form a well-connected network, in a way similar
to Bitcoin, where they can broadcast a message to their peers, and
that communication comes “for free.”
Types of players. We follow the BAR model [8], which means
players are either (1) Byzantine, meaning that they behave in an
arbitrary way; (2) altruistic, meaning that they follow the protocol;
or (3) rational, meaning that they act to maximize their expected
utility. We use (fB , fA, fR ) to denote the respective fractions of
Byzantine, altruistic and rational players. Previous research has
shown that altruistic behavior is indeed observed in real-world
systems (like Tor or torrenting) [5], so is reasonable to consider. In
addition to these types, as stated in Section 3.4 we also consider
passive participants. They represent the users of a currency who
keep a copy of the blockchain and passively verify every block
(i.e., the full nodes). They will not explicitly appear in the protocol,
rather we assume that they “force” the creation of valid blocks as
we explain in Section 7, since if the chain includes invalid blocks
or other obvious forms of misbehavior they will simply abandon
or fork the currency. When we say participant or player, we now
mean active player unless specified otherwise.
We consider a semi-permissionless setting, meaning that every-
one is allowed to join the protocol but they have to place a security
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deposit locking some of their funds to do so; if they wish to leave
the protocol, then they must wait some period of time before they
can access these funds again. This allows us to keep the openness
of decentralization while preventing Sybils. Moreover we consider
a flat-model meaning that one participants account for one unit of
stake. Thus saying two-third of participants is equivalent to say-
ing participants that together own two-third of the stake that is
in deposit. Most of the paper makes the assumptions of dynamic
committee where participants can leave and join as explained above.
However, to consider a notion of finality, we will need to strengthen
this assumption. We will detail these assumptions in Section 6, but
briefly we will allow for a reconfiguration period, and assume that
outside of this period the set of participants is fixed.
4.2 A model for leader election
Most of the consensus protocols in the distributed systems liter-
ature are leader-based, as it is the optimal solution in term of co-
ordination [42]. Perhaps as a result, leader election has in general
been very well studied within the distributed systems commu-
nity [27, 35, 41, 50, 51]. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge
the problem of leader election has not been given an extensive
security-focused treatment, so in this section we provide a threat
model in which we consider a variety of adversarial behavior.
Each participant maintains some private state statepriv, and their
view of the public state statepub. For ease of exposition, we as-
sume each statepriv includes the public state statepub. We refer to
a message sent by a participant as a transaction, denoted tx, where
this transaction can either be broadcast to other participants (as
in a more classical consensus protocol) or committed to a public
blockchain.
Our model consists of three algorithms and one interactive pro-
tocol, which behave as follows:
(statepriv, txcom) $← Commit(statepub) is used by a participant to
commit themselves to participating in the leader election. This
involves establishing both an initial private state statepriv and a
public announcement txcom.
{state(i)priv}i $← Update(1λ ,P, {(rnd, state
(i)
priv)}i ) is run amongst the
committed participants, each of whom is given rnd and their own
private state state(i)priv, in order to update both the public state
statepub and their own private states to prepare the leader elec-
tion for round rnd.
txrev
$← Reveal(rnd, statepriv) is used by a participant to broadcast
a proof of their eligibility txrev for round rnd (or ⊥ if they are not
eligible).
0/1 ← Verify(statepub, txrev) is used by a participant to verify a
claim txrev.
We would like a leader election protocol to achieve three security
properties: liveness, unpredictability, and fairness. The first property
maps to the established property of liveness for classical consensus
protocols, although as we see below we consider several different
flavors of unpredictability that are specific to the blockchain-based
setting. The final one, fairness (related to chain quality [28]), is
especially important in open protocols like blockchains, in which
participation must be explicitly incentivized rather than assumed.
We begin by defining liveness, which requires that consensus
can be achieved even if some fraction of participants are malicious
or inactive.
Definition 4.1 (Liveness). Let fA be the fraction of participants
controlled by an adversary A. Then a leader election protocol
satisfies fA -liveness if it is still possible to elect a leader even in the
face of such an A; i.e., if for every public state statepub that has
been produced via Update with the possible participation of A, it
is still possible for at least one participant, in a round rnd, to output
a value txrev such that Verify(statepub, txrev) = 1.
Unpredictability requires that participants cannot predict which
participants will be elected leader before some time.
Definition 4.2 (Unpredictability). A leader election protocol sat-
isfies unpredictability if, prior to some step barrier in the protocol,
no PT adversary A can produce better than a random guess at
whether or not a given participant will be eligible for round rnd,
except with negligible probability. If barrier is the step in which a
participant broadcasts txrev, and we require A to guess only about
the eligibility of honest participants (rather than participants they
control), then we say it satisfies delayed unpredictability. If it is still
difficult for A to guess even about their own eligibility, we say it
satisfies private unpredictability.
Most consensus protocols satisfy only the regular variant of un-
predictability we define, where barrier is the point at which the
Update interaction is “ready” for round rnd (e.g., the participants
have completed a coin-tossing). This typically occurs at the start of
the round, but may also occur several rounds beforehand.
If an adversary is aware of the eligibility of other participants
ahead of time, then it may be able to target these specific partici-
pants for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, which makes achieving
liveness more difficult. This also helps to obtain security against a
fully adaptive adversary that is able to dynamically update the set
of participants it is corrupting. (Since they do not know in advance
which participants to corrupt to gain an advantage.) A protocol
that satisfies delayed unpredictability solves this issue, however,
as participants reveal their own eligibility only when they choose
to do so, by which point it may be too late for the adversary to do
anything. (For example, in a proof-of-stake protocol, if participants
include proofs of eligibility only in the blocks they propose, then
by the time the leader is known the adversary has nothing to gain
by targeting them for a DoS attack. Similarly, an adversary cannot
know which participants to corrupt in advance because it does not
know if they will be eligible.)
A protocol that satisfies private unpredictability, in contrast, is
able to prevent an adversary from inflating their own role as a
leader. For example, if an adversary can predict many rounds into
the future what their own eligibility will be, they may attempt to
bias the protocol in their favor by grinding through the problem
space in order to produce an initial commitment txcom that yields
good future results.
Private unpredictability thus helps to guarantee fairness, which
we define as requiring that each committed participant is selected as
leader equally often. While for the sake of simplicity our definition
considers equal weighting of participants, it can easily be extended
to consider participants with respect to some other distribution
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(e.g., in a proof-of-stake application, participants may be selected
as leader in proportion to their represented “stake” in the system).
Definition 4.3 (Fairness). A leader election protocol is fair if for
all PT adversaries A the probability that A is selected as leader
is nearly uniform; i.e., for all rnd, statepriv, statepub (where again
statepub has been produced by Update with the possible partici-
pation of A), and txrev created by A, Pr[Verify(statepub, txrev) =
1] ≈ 1/n.
4.3 Blockchain-based consensus
As with leader election, each participant maintains some private
state statepriv and some view of the public state statepub. We con-
sider the following set of algorithms run by participants:
statepriv
$← Setup(1λ) is used to establish the initial state: a public
view of the blockchain (that is the same for every player) and
their private state. This includes the Commit phase of the leader
election protocol.
π $← Eligible(B, statepriv) is run by each participant to determine
if they are eligible to place a bet on a block B. If so, the algorithm
outputs a proof π (and if not it outputs ⊥), that other partici-
pants can verify using Verify(statepub,π ). The Verify algorithm
is the same as the one used in the leader election protocol, where
π=txrev.
B $← Bet(statepriv) is used to create a new block and bet on some
previous block.
B← FCR(G) defines the fork-choice rule that dictates which block
altruistic players should bet on. To do so, it gives an explicit score
to different chains, and chooses the tip of the chain with the
biggest score.
0/1 ← VerifyBlock(G,B) determineswhether or not a block is valid,
according to the current state of the blockDAG.
M← Label(G) defines a function Label : G → M that takes a
view of the blockDAG and associates with every block a label in
{winner, loser, neutral}. This is crucial for incentivization, and is
used to determine the reward that will be associated with every
block. With each map Label, and player i , we associate a utility
function uLabeli that takes as input a blockDAG and outputs the
utility of player i for that blockDAG. We will write uLabeli = ui if
the label function is clear from context. The list of winning blocks
constitutes a chain, which we call the main chain. Every chain of
blocks that is not the main chain is called a fork.
Wewould like a blockchain consensus protocol to satisfy a few se-
curity properties. Unlike with leader election, these have been care-
fully considered in the cryptographic literature [28, 44]. As defined
by Pass et al. [44], there are four desirable properties of blockchain
consensus protocols: consistency, future self-consistency, chain
growth, and chain quality.
Chain growth [28] corresponds to the concept of liveness in dis-
tributed systems, and says the chain maintained by honest players
grows with time. Consistency (also called common prefix [28]) and
future self-consistency both capture the notion of safety tradition-
ally used in the distributed systems literature. Consistency states
that any two honest players should agree on their view of the chain
except for the last Y blocks, and future self-consistency states that
a player and their “future self” agree on their view of the chain
except for the last Y blocks (the idea being that a player’s chain will
not change drastically over time). In our paper, we consider not just
a blockchain-based consensus protocol, but in fact one based on a
blockDAG. Participants thus do not keep only the longest chain,
but all the blocks they receive, which makes it difficult to use these
definitions as is. Instead, we use the notion of convergence,which
states that after some time, player converges towards a chain, mean-
ing that no two altruistic players diverge on their view of the main
chain except perhaps for the last blocks, and that a block that is in
the main chain at some time τ0 will still be in the main chain for
any time t > τ0. We also ask that this condition holds for a chain
of any length, thus capturing the chain growth (or liveness) in the
same definition. More formally we define convergence as follows:
Definition 4.4 (Convergence). For every k0 ∈ N, there exists a
chainC0k0 of length k0 and time τ0 such that: for all altruistic players
i and time t > τ0: C0k0 ⊆ C
i,t , except with negligible propability,
where Ci,t denotes the main chain of i at time t .
Chain quality [28] corresponds to the notion of fairness, and
says that honest players contribute some meaningful fraction of all
blocks in the chain.
Definition 4.5 (Chain quality). Chain quality, parameterized by
α , says that an adversary controlling a fraction fC = fB + fR of
non-altruistic players can contribute at most a fraction µ = fC + α
of the blocks in the main chain.
Finally, we define a relatively unexplored property in blockchain
consensus, robustness, that explicitly captures the incentivization
mechanism. The security notion is not considered by any consensus
protocols (except [7] that states that they leave the proof for future
work) and is paramount to capture the security of systems where
incentives are at the core.
Definition 4.6 (Robustness). A protocol is ϵ-robust if given some
fractions (fB , fA, fR ) of BAR players, following the protocol is a
ϵ-(fR , fB )-robust equilibrium.
5 CAUCUS: A LEADER ELECTION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present Caucus, a leader election protocol with
minimal coordination that satisfies fairness, liveness, and strong
notions of unpredictability.
5.1 Our construction
The full Caucus protocol is summarized in Figure 2. Our construc-
tion is similar to that of Algorand [31]. We, however, add a secure
initialization of the random beacon and use Verifiable Random De-
lays to achieve liveness.
We assume participants have generated signing keypairs and
are aware of the public key associated with each other participant
(which can easily be achieved at the time participants run Commit).
We omit the process of generating keys from our formal descrip-
tions.
To to be considered as potential leaders, participants must place
a security deposit, which involves creating a commitment to their
VRF secret key. This means the Commit function runs Gen and
returns the VRF secret key as the private state of the participant
and the VRF public key (incorporated into a transaction) as the
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Commit: A participant commits to their VRF secret key sk by creating a Commit transaction txcom that contains the VRF public key pk .
Each broadcast commitment is added to a list c maintained in statepub, and that participant is considered eligible to be elected
leader after some fixed number of rounds have passed.
Update: Once enough participants are committed, participants run a secure coin-tossing protocol to obtain a random value R1. They
output a new statepub = (c,R1). This interactive protocol is run only for rnd = 1.
Reveal: For rnd > 1, every participant verifies their own eligibility by checking if H (yrnd) < target, where yrnd = Gsk (Rrnd) and
target = Hmax/nrnd. (Here nrnd is the number of eligible participants; i.e., the number of participants that have committed a
sufficient number of rounds before rnd and possibly have not been elected leader in the previous rounds.) The eligible participant,
if one exists, then creates a transaction txrev with their data yrnd and prnd = psk (Rrnd) and broadcasts it to their peers.
Verify: Upon receiving a transaction txrev from a participant i , participants extract yrnd and prnd from txrev and check whether or not
VerifyVRF(Rrnd,yrnd,prnd) = 1. If these checks pass, then the public randomness is updated as Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd ⊕ yrnd and they
output 1, and otherwise the public state stays the same and they output 0.
Figure 2: The Caucus protocol.
transaction to add to a list of commitments c in the public state.
In the first round, participants must interact to establish a shared
random value. This can be done by running a coin-tossing protocol
to generate a random value R1. We suggest using SCRAPE [19], due
to its low computational complexity and compatibility with public
ledgers. Any solution that instantiates a publicly verifiable secret
sharing (PVSS) scheme, however, would also be suitable. The only
requirement that we have is that the PVSS should output a value
that is of the same type as the value output by the VRF function G.
For each subsequent round, participants then verify whether or
not they are eligible to fold their randomness into the global value
by checking if H (Gsk (Rrnd)) < target, where the value of target
depends on the number of expected leaders per round (for example,
we choose target = Hmax/nrnd in order to have on expectation one
leader per round). If this holds, then they reveal yrnd = Gsk (Rrnd)
and prnd = psk (Rrnd) to the other participants, who can verify
that the inequality holds and that VerifyVRF(Rrnd,yrnd,prnd) = 1.
If the participant is in fact eligible, then they are deemed to be
the leader for that round and the global randomness is updated as
Rrnd+1 ← Rrnd ⊕ yrnd.
To fully achieve security, we describe two necessary alterations
to the basic protocol as presented thus far. First, in order to main-
tain unpredictability, participants should become eligible only after
some fixed number of rounds have passed since they ran Commit.
This means updating Verify to also check that rndjoined > rnd − x
(where rndjoined is the round in which the participant broadcast
txcom and x is the required number of interim rounds). This has
the effect that an adversary controlling fA participants cannot
privately predict that they will be elected leader for a few rounds
and then grind through potential new secret key values to continue
their advantage via new commitments, as the probability will be
sufficiently high that at least one honest participant will be elected
leader between the time they commit and the time they participate.
Second, it could be the case that in some round, no participant
is elected leader. It could also be the case that an adversary is the
only elected leader and does not reveal their proof of eligibility
and abort. To maintain liveness, we alter the protocol so that if
no participant reveals txrev, we “update” the random beacon as
Rrnd ← F (Rrnd), where F is a deterministic function that acts as
a proof-of-delay [14, 16]. The simplest example of such a function
is F = Hp ; i.e., a hash function iterated p times. When a honest
player is not eligible on the winning block, they start computing
the proof-of-delay and if by the time it is computed no leader has
been revealed, they check their eligibility with the updated beacon
F (Rrnd). One can think of this as re-drawing the lottery after some
delay. This allows participants to continue the protocol (and, since it
is purely deterministic, is different from proof-of-work), but has the
downside that verification is also costly, as it requires participants
to re-compute the hashes. Bünz et al. recently proposed an efficient
Verifiable Random Delay function [14] that can be efficiently and
publicly verified yet requires sequential steps to compute. This
proof-of-delay should be used sparingly so we consider it accept-
able that it is expensive. Moreover we make the assumptions that
the time δ that it takes to compute the proof-of-delay is bigger than
the parameter ∆ of our semi-synchronous model.
It could also be the case, however, that there are two or more
winners in a round. In a setting such as proof-of-stake, being elected
leader comes with a financial reward, and conflicts may arise if
two winners are elected (such as the nothing-at-stake problem dis-
cussed in Section 3.3). One potential solution (also suggested by
Algorand [31]) for electing a single leader is to require all partic-
ipants to submit their winning values yrnd and then select as the
winner the participant whose pre-image yrnd has the lowest bit
value. This problem is investigated further in Section 6, where we
present the full Fantômette protocol.
Finally, we describe a third, optional alteration designed to im-
prove fairness by forcing more rotation amongst the leaders. To be
elected, we require that a participant has not acted as leader in the
past (nrnd − 1)/2 rounds, which can be implemented by adding a
condition in the Verify function and using (nrnd + 1)/2 in place of
nrnd in the computation of the value target.
5.2 Security
In order to prove the security of Caucus as a whole, we first prove
the security of its implicit random beacon.
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Lemma 5.1. If H is a random oracle and R is initialized using a se-
cure coin-tossing protocol, then the random beacon Rrnd is also secure;
i.e., it satisfies liveness (Definition 3.2), unbiasability (Definition 3.4),
and unpredictability (Definition 3.3) for every subsequent round.
Proof. For liveness, we observe that after initialization, no co-
ordination is required, so any online participant can communicate
their own eligibility to other online participants, allowing them to
compute the new random value. The exception is the case where
no participant is elected leader, in which case participants can up-
date their random value by Rrnd ← F (Rrnd) until a leader reveals
themselves.
For unpredictability, we must show that, unless the adversary
is itself the next leader, it is hard to learn the value of Rrnd before
it receives txrev. We have Rrnd = Rrnd−1 ⊕ yrnd−1, where Rrnd−1
is assumed to be known. In the protocol, the adversary sees pk
as part of the commitment of the relevant honest participant, and
if that participant has run Reveal before it may have also seen
y′rnd = Gsk (R′rnd) for rnd′ < rnd. If the adversary could produce
better than a random guess about Rrnd then they would also pro-
duce better than a random guess aboutGsk (Rrnd)which contradicts
its pseudo-randomness.
For unbiasability, we proceed inductively. By assumption, R is
initialized in a fair way, which establishes the base case. Now, we as-
sume that Rrnd−1 is uniformly distributed, and would like to show
that Rrnd will be as well. By the assumption that Rrnd is unpre-
dictable, and thus unknown at the time an adversary commits to
their secret key, the distribution of yrnd and Rrnd is thus indepen-
dent. (As the adversary cannot grind through private keys since
they do not know Rrnd at the time they commit and G verifies unic-
ity.) If we define a value R, and denote R′ ← R ⊕ yrnd−1, then we
have
Pr[Rrnd = R] = Pr[yrnd−1 ⊕ Rrnd−1 = yrnd−1 ⊕ R′]
= Pr[Rrnd−1 = R′],
which we know to be uniformly random by assumption, thus for
every R′, we have Pr[Rrnd−1 = R′] ≈ 1/(2ℓ − 1) and for every
value R, Pr[Rrnd = R] ≈ 1/(2ℓ − 1), proving the fairness of Rrnd.
(Here ℓ denotes the bitlength of R.) An adversary controlling many
winning values for Rrnd−1, however, may decide on the one they
reveal, which makes it difficult to argue for unbiasability when the
adversary controls many players. This is a limitation of Caucus that
we address (or at least quantify) in our analysis of Fantômette in
Section 7.
□
Theorem 5.2. If H is a random oracle and R is initialized as
a uniformly random value, then Caucus is a secure leader election
protocol; i.e., it satisfies liveness, fairness, delayed unpredictability
(where barrier is the step at which the elected leader reveals their
proof), and private unpredictability (where barrier is the step at which
the randomness Rrnd is fixed).
Proof. For liveness, a participant is elected if they broadcast
a valid transaction txrev such that H (yrnd) < target. If Update
satisfies fA-liveness then an adversary controlling fA partici-
pants cannot prevent honest participants from agreeing on Rrnd.
In the case where no participants produce a value yrnd such that
H (yrnd) < target, we update the value of Rrnd as described above
until one participant is elected. With a similar argument as in the
proof of Theorem 5.1, the protocol thus achieves liveness.
For fairness, a participant wins if H (Gsk (Rrnd)) < targetrnd. By
the assumption that Rrnd is unpredictable, and unknown at the
time an adversary commits to their secret, we have that an adver-
sary could not have grind through secret keys to bias Gsk (Rrnd).
Combining this with the assumption that Rrnd is unbiasable and
thus uniformly distributed, we can argue that yrnd = Gsk (Rrnd) is
uniformly distributed. This implies that the probability that the
winning condition holds is also uniformly random, as desired.
The argument for delayed unpredictability is almost identical
to the one in the proof of Theorem 5.1: even when Rrnd is known,
if A has not formed yrnd itself then by the pseudo-randomness of
G it cannot predict whether H (Gsk (Rrnd)) < targetrnd. (If it could
then the adversary could use that to distinguish Gsk (Rrnd) from
random with an advantage.)
Finally, private unpredictability follows from the unpredictabil-
ity of Rrnd.
In terms of the fraction fC of malicious participants that we
can tolerate, it is t/n, where t is the threshold of the PVSS scheme
used to initialize the random beacon. In the context of proof-of-
stake, however, we would still need to assume an honest majority.
We investigate this in the next section, where we present the full
Fantômette protocol. □
Even if the initial value was some constant instead of a randomly
generated one, we could still argue that the protocol is fair after
the point that the randomness of at least one honest participant
is incorporated into the beacon. This assumption is weakened the
longer the beacon is live, so works especially well in settings where
the leader election protocol is used to bootstrap from one form
of consensus (e.g., PoW) to another (e.g., PoS), as discussed for
Ethereum [56].
6 FANTÔMETTE: A CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
In this section, we present Fantômette, our full blockchain con-
sensus protocol. Our focus is on incentives, and in particular on
enforcing good behavior even in settings where no natural incen-
tives or investments exist already.
Briefly, Fantômette works as follows: participants bet on the
block that has the strongest score, according to their view of the
blockDAG. They also reference all the leaves (i.e., the most recent
blocks) of which they are aware, to “prove” that they are well con-
nected and following the rules. A block is valid if among all of its
references, it is indeed betting on the one with the higher score. We
argue for its security more extensively in the next section, but give
here some intuition for how it addresses the challenges presented
in the PoS setting introduced in Section 3.3. First, Fantômette solves
the nothing-at-stake problem by strongly punishing players who
do not reference their own blocks, and ensuring that players bet
only on the strongest chain they see. As it is not possible for two
chains to appear as the strongest at the same time, this prevents
players from betting on multiple chains.
The grinding attack is prevented largely due to the unbiasability
of the random beacon in Caucus, and the optional requirement that
leaders must rotate with sufficient frequency discussed at the end of
8
Section 5.1. Finally, long-range attacks are thwarted by Fantômette’s
finality rule, which acts as a form of decentralized checkpointing.
6.1 Protocol specification
We specify how to instantiate the algorithms required for a con-
sensus protocol specified in Section 4.3. The Setup and Eligible
algorithms are as described for Caucus in Section 5. Before present-
ing the rest of the algorithms, we give some additional definitions
associated with finality in blockDAGs.
In order to make the following definitions, we assume a static
set of players. We then present how to handle a dynamic set. Let’s
also recall that thanks to the deposit, the set of players is known
to everyone. A candidate block is a block, as its name suggests,
that is a candidate for finality. The initial list of candidate blocks
consists of every block betting on the genesis block; i.e., every block
that uses this as its parent Bprev. Whenever a block has in its past
two-thirds of bets on a candidate, this block acts as a witness to
the finality of that block, so is called a witness block. If a block B1
is a witness for B0 and B2 is a witness for B1, we say that B2 is a
second witness of B0. Finally, candidate blocks belong to a given
rank, which we denote by rk. The first set of candidate blocks (after
the genesis block) belong to rk = 1. After this every block that
bets on a second witness block of rank rk and has a distance of w
with this block is a candidate for rank rk + 1. The above process
constitutes a decentralized checkpointing.
Using the sample blockDAG in Figure 1, for example, and assum-
ing three players and w = 0, the initial list of candidate blocks is
{A,B,C,D} (which all have rank rk = 1). Block E then bets onA, as
does block H (since A is an ancestor of H ), so H can be considered
as a witness block for A. Similarly, I acts as a witness block for C .
Since this now constitutes two-thirds of the participants, A and C
become justified [56]. If in turn two-thirds of participants place bets
on the associated witness blocks, then the justified block becomes
finalized. With w = 0, the second witness blocks are added to the
candidate list accordingly, but at rank rk = 2.
In order to handle a dynamic set of players, once a block is fi-
nalized (i.e. once there exists at least one second witness block) we
allow for a window of w blocks for the players to leave or join the
protocol. At the end of this period, the set of players is fixed and
the decentralized checkpointing resumes with as new candidate
blocks, all blocks that have a distance w with a second witness
block for rank rk. We leave as important future work a solution
that would allow players to leave and join the protocol even during
the checkpointing period.
Fork choice rule. We present a formal specification of our fork
choice rule FCR in Algorithm 6.1. Intuitively, the algorithm chooses
blocks with more connections to other blocks. Accordingly, we
compute the score of a leaf block B by counting the number of
outgoing references for every block in its past. We do not count,
however, blocks that have been created by an adversary using the
same eligibility proof multiple times. We denote as Double the set
of all blocks that contains the same proof of eligibility but different
content. The score of a chain whose tip is B is then the number of
edges in the subgraph induced by Past(B) \ Double, and we pick
as a “winner” the leaf with the highest score. If there is a tie (i.e.,
two leaf blocks have the same score), we break it by using the block
with the smallest hash.1
Algorithm 6.1: Fork-choice rule (FCR)
input :a DAG G
output :a block B representing the latest “winner”
1 if (G = Genesis Block) then
2 return G
3 w ← ∅
4 for B ∈ Leaves(G) do
5 for B′ in Past(B) \ Double do
6 w[B′] = |B′[Bleaf]|
7 CW← argmaxB∈leaf(G)w(B)
// if there is a tie choose block with smaller hash
8 B← argminB∈CWH (B)
9 return B
Betting. To place a bet, a participant first identifies the latest
winning block as B ← FCR(Gpub). They then check their latest
second witness block (if they have one) and verify that at least one
candidate block associated with it is also in Ancestors(B) (i.e. they
verify that the block was not created maliciously as part of a long
range attack). They then check to see if they are eligible to act as a
leader by computing π $← Eligible(B, statepriv). If they are (i.e., if
π , ⊥), then they form a block with B as the parent, with all other
blocks of which they are aware as the leaf blocks, and with their
proof of eligibility π and set of transactions.
Block validity. We now define the rules that make a block valid;
i.e., the checks performed by VerifyBlock(G,B). Intuitively, a valid
block must be betting on the block chosen by the fork-choice rule,
and its creator must be eligible to bet on that block. If a player is
aware of a justified block, then they must bet on either that block
or another witness block, but cannot prefer a non-justified block to
a justified one.
More formally, a new block B = (Bprev,Bleaf ,π , txset) is valid
only if the following hold:
(1) It is betting on the block chosen by the fork choice rule for the
blocks of which it is aware; i.e., Bprev = FCR(Past(B)).
(2) The creator is eligible to bet: Eligible(Bprev, stateB.sndpriv ) , ⊥.
(3) If it references a witness block then it is betting on a witness block;
i.e., if there exists a witness block in Past(B) then there exists a
witness block in Ancestors(B).
(4) If it references a second witness block, then it is betting on a block
in the past of that block: if there exists a second witness block
Bs ∈ Past(B), then Ancestors(B) ∩ Past(Bs ) , ∅.
6.2 Incentives
Label. We present a formal specification of our label function
Label in Algorithm 6.2. Intuitively, if a block is chosen by the FCR
it is labelled winner and so are all of its ancestors. Blocks that
bet on winners are labeled neutral. Following the techniques in
1It is important, to avoid grinding attacks, to use the hash as defined in Caucus, or
something else similarly unbiasable.
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PHANTOM [54], all winning and neutral blocks form a subset of
the DAG called the blue subset and denoted by blue. Every block
whose anticone intersects with fewer than k blocks in the blue set
is labeled neutral, and otherwise it is labeled loser. The parameter
k is called the inter-connectivity parameter, and means that a block
is allowed to be “unaware” of k winning blocks, but not more (as,
e.g., these blocks may have been created at roughly the same time).
Algorithm 6.2: Label
input :A DAG G
output :A labelling of the block in the DAGM
1 set B← FCR(G)
2 blue← blue ∪ {B}
3 M(B) = winner
4 for Bi ∈ Ancestors(B) do
5 blue← blue ∪ {Bi }
6 M(Bi ) = winner
7 for Bj ∈ DirectFuture(Bi ) \ Ancestors(B) do
8 blue← blue ∪ {Bj }
9 M(Bj ) = neutral
10 for Bi ∈ G \ blue do
11 if Anticone(Bi ) ∩ blue ≤ k then
12 blue← blue ∪ {Bi }
13 M(Bj ) = neutral
14 else
15 M(Bi ) = loser
16 returnM
Utility functions. At the end of the game, which we define to be
of length T , as defined in Section 4, we take the BCPD and apply
the Label function to it, in order to associate each block with a state.
For every winning block that a player has added to the BCPD, they
win a reward of rwd(B), and for every losing block they lose pun.
In addition, if a player creates a block that does not reference one of
their own blocks, we add a bigger punishment bigpun (for example,
blocks that belong to the set Double defined previously will add
this punishment). This punishment is bigger because a player is
obviously aware of all their own blocks, so if they do not reference
one it is an obvious form of misbehavior (whereas a block might
end up being labelled a loser for other reasons).
More formally, we define the following utility function:
ui (BCPD) =
∑
B∈BCPD s.t.
B.snd=i and
M (B)=winner
rwd(B) −
∑
B∈BCPD s.t.
B.snd=i and
M (B)=loser
pun
+ bigpun × |N | (1)
whereM = Label(BCPD) and
N = {(Bj ,Bk ) s.t. Bj .snd = i ∧ Bk .snd = i ∧
Bj < Past(Bk ) ∧ Bk < Past(Bj )}
The reward function is proportional to the connectivity of a
block; i.e., a block that references many blocks receives more than
a block that references only one other block. The reason is that we
want to incentivize players to exchange blocks between each other,
rather than produce blocks privately (as in a selfish mining attack).
In this paper we consider a simple function rwd(B) = |Bleaf | ×c for
some constant c , and treat pun and bigpun as constants. We leave
the study of more complex reward and punishment mechanisms as
interesting future work.
One of the difficulties of dealing with blockchain-based consen-
sus, compared to traditional protocols, is that the enforcement of
the payoff is achieved only by consensus; i.e., the utilities depend
on whether or not enough players enforce them. In order to enforce
the payoff, we thus assume that participants can give a reward to
themselves in forming their blocks (similarly to Bitcoin), but that
evidence of fraud can be submitted by other players. If another
player submits evidence of fraud, the subsequent punishment is
taken from the security deposit of the cheating player.
7 SECURITY OF FANTÔMETTE
In this section, we show that Fantômette is secure, according to
the model in Section 4. We support our proofs with a simulation of
the protocol as a game played between Byzantine, altruistic, and
rational players in Section 7.3.
7.1 Action Space
We discuss the different strategies available to a coalition of play-
ers, whether Byzantine or rational. They can take any deviation
possible from the game. We do assume, however, that they create
valid blocks, as otherwise passive players will simply ignore their
chains (as discussed in Section 4).
If an adversary withholds their blocks, it can gain an advantage
in subsequent leader elections. To see this, consider that after each
block each player has a probability 1/n of being elected leader.
Being a leader does not guarantee a winning block, however, as
only the block with the smallest hash wins. For each block, the
number of subsequent players k that are elected leader follows a
binomial distribution parameterized by n and 1/n. Assuming the
leader election is secure, each of these leaders is equally likely to
have the winning block, so each player has probability 1/(kn) of
being the winner. By not revealing a block, this probability goes
up to 1/n (since other players are simply not aware of it), so by
keeping their chain private an adversary can raise their chance
of having a winning block. We thus assume that both Byzantine
and rational players withhold their blocks and grind through all
possible subsequent blocks in order to maximize their advantage.
In terms of the space that players grind through, the main op-
tion they have when elected leader is whether to place a bet or
not. The protocol dictates that they must bet on the fork-choice
rule only, but they may wish to bet on a different block (as, e.g.,
doing so could increase their chances of being elected leader in the
future). In order to still maintain the validity of their blocks, doing
so means they must eliminate references in their set Bleaf so that
their chosen block appears as the fork-choice rule (in accordance
with the first check in VerifyBlock). Players are always better off,
however, including as many blocks as possible in their references,
as it increases the score of their block. Thus, they will remove ref-
erences to blocks that have higher scores in order to make their
block appear as the fork-choice rule, but not more than necessary.
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For rational players, there is a trade-off between not revealing
their block (which raises their chance of having more winning
blocks, as argued above) and revealing their block, which reduces
their chance of having more winning blocks but increases their
reward because it allows their block to have more references. Our
simulation investigates this trade-off. Regardless, the strategy of
rational players is to grind through all possible blocks and broadcast
the chain that maximizes their utility. Byzantine players, in contrast,
do not try to maximize their profit, but instead play irrationally
(i.e., they are not deterred by punishment).
7.2 Security arguments
According to the security properties in Section 4.3, we need to
argue three things: convergence, chain quality, and robustness. We
support these security properties with our simulation in Section 7.3
Before proving each security property, we first prove some general
results about the protocol. Assume that two blocks B1 and B2 are
two competing blocks with the same score, betting on the same
block. We call the stronger chain the one with the higher score
according to a hypothetical oracle node that collates the views of
the blockDAG maintained by all participants. We assume that B1 is
the leaf of the stronger chain.
Claim 7.1. On average, blocks added to the stronger chain add
more to its score than blocks added on the weaker chain.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove the result for two
chains with the same score S . For simplicity, we assume that the
chains do not reference each other (e.g., chains {A,C} and {B,D} in
Figure 3). By the definition of scoring in the FCR (Algorithm 6.1), a
block betting on the stronger chain adds a score of S+2 if the leader
is aware of the leaf block on the weaker chain, and S + 2− 1 = S + 1
otherwise. (For example, E adds a score of S + 2 by referencing
both C and D, and S + 1 by referencing C and B if it is not aware
of D.) The block that they receive first has probability 0.5 of being
stronger or weaker as the random beacon has uniform distribution,
thus on average, the score added by one block to the stronger chain
is 0.5 · (S+2)+0.5 · (S+1) = S+1.5. On the weaker chain, in contrast,
Genesis 
block
A
B
C
D
E
F
Figure 3: Example of two blocks added on competing chains.
whether the leader is aware of the stronger leaf block or not does
not matter since they cannot reference it while maintaining the
validity of their block (according to the first check in VerifyBlock).
Thus the score added to the weaker chain is (S − 1) + 2 = S + 1,
since that block references the stronger chain but not on its latest
block. □
We show in Theorem 7.2 that for a given rank, all second wit-
nesses share the same set of candidate blocks provided that fB <
1/3. The idea is that whenever a block is finalized, all players have
Genesis 
block
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Y1
Y2
Z1
Z2
2/3+
2/3+
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. . .
. . .
. . .
Figure 4: A visual sketch of the proof of Theorem 7.2. A participant
placing a bet between x2 andy2, andy1 and z1 must have placed their
bet on x2 first, thus z1 references x2.
agreed on the current set of candidate blocks, and thus they should
not accept any other candidate blocks at that rank (as required by
the betting algorithm stated in Section 6).
Theorem 7.2 (Finality). If fB < 1/3, then once a block at rank
rk is finalized, players agree on a list of candidate blocks for rank rk
(i.e., this list cannot grow anymore).
Proof. Assume there exist two finalized blocks x1 and x2. De-
note by yi the witness block for xi , and by zi the second witness
block for xi . By the definition of finality, it must have been the case
that more than two-thirds of participants placed bets on x1 and x2,
which in turn implies that more than a third of them placed bets on
both x1 and x2. Since only a third of participants are Byzantine, this
means that at least one non-Byzantine player placed a bet on both
blocks. (Let’s recall that during the decentralized checkpointing
the set of players is fixed.) Non-Byzantine players always reference
their own block (since there is a large punishment incurred if not);
this means that there is one of the witness blocks yi that references
“across the chains”; i.e., such that x1,x2 ∈ Past(yi ).
Without loss of generality, assume that x1,x2 ∈ Past(y2). This
means that x1 ∈ Past(z2) and thus x1,x2 ∈ Past(z2). Since more
than two-thirds of the participants bet on y1, by a similar reasoning
as above this means that at least one non-Byzantine player placed
a bet on both y1 and x2 (before y2). Thus, either (1) z1 references x2
or (2) y2 references y1. Because of the third check in VerifyBlock,
however, this second case is not possible: sincey1 is a witness block,
y2 cannot reference it without betting on a justified block, and x2
is not justified before y2. We refer the reader to graph 4 for a visual
intuition of this. Thus, it must be the case that z1 references x2.
Thus zi references both xi and x j for i , j.
For a set of candidate blocks, all the second witness blocks thus
reference all candidate blocks (applying the previous analysis to
all the candidates blocks pair-wise). So, after a candidate block is
finalized, players must agree on the set of candidate blocks for that
rank.
We will investigate the long-range attack in the proof of the
convergence theorem. □
Next, we show convergence. Intuitively, the main argument here
is that if an adversary tries to grow multiple chains to prevent
altruistic players from agreeing on a main chain, altruistic players
are still very likely to agree on a chain, since the score of the main
chain grows faster than the score of other chains. Additonally,
since an adversary is unlikely to be elected leader for a consecutive
number of blocks, it is unlikely that other players will revert their
main chain once they have agreed on one. Even if the adversary
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somehow manages to build their own private chain (by, e.g., using
the proof-of-delay or bribing old participants in a long-range attack),
the decentralized checkpointing mechanism in Fantômette provides
a notion of finality for blocks. Thus, by the time they succeed in
mounting such an attack, it will be too late and other participants
will not accept their chain.
Theorem 7.3 (Convergence). Given a coalition fC < 1/3 of
non-altruistic players, we have: for every k0 ∈ N, there exists a chain
C0k0 of length k0 and time τ0 such that: for all altruistic players i and
times t > τ0: C0k0 ⊆ C
i,t , except with negligible propability, where
Ci,t is the main chain of player i at time t .
Proof. We start by showing that the length of the longest chain
in the DAG, indeed grows. This is relatively straightforward, and
follows from the discussion around liveness in Section 6.1. To sum-
marize, even if a Byzantine player is the only leader and chooses
not to publish a block, after some delay players will “re-draw” the
lottery and an altruistic player will be chosen eventually. We now
calculate the worst-case growth rate of the main chain, which hap-
pens when the adversary simply aborts. If an adversary controls nC
players, then an aborting player is elected leader with probability
1 − (1 − p)nC . This means that after each block, the chain will grow
normally with probability (1 − p)nC and will grow with a delay
of δ (where δ is the delay in the proof-of-delay) with probability
1−(1−p)nC . Moreover since a block is propagated with a maximum
delay of ∆, we have that the worst rate at which a block is created
is (1 − p)nC · ∆ + (1 − (1 − p)nC ) · (∆ + δ ) = ∆ + δ · (1 − (1 − p)nC ).
However it could be the case that more than one chain grows in
the DAG. We now move on to prove the core of the protocol.
Let k0 be an integer. Due to the previous argument about the
growth of the chain and the semi-synchrony assumption (all play-
ers receive a block before ∆ slots), there exists a time τ1 such that
every honest player have in their DAG at least one chain Ck0 of
length k0. Let’s assume that there exists two such chains Ck0 and
C ′k0 . We show that, with high probability, after some time τ0 one
will be “dropped” and thus for the remaining one we will have that
for every t > τ0 C0k0 ⊆ C
i,t .
Let’s assume that players start creating blocks on both chains.
After some time less or equal than ∆ players will be aware of the
other chain and thus can start referencing it (remember that ∆ is
smaller than δ ). Then it has to be the case that the score of one
chain will grow faster than the other one as shown in Claim 7.1
(even if both chain keep growing). Now, we argue why it is unlikely
that both chain keep growing indefinitely. The weaker chain grows
only if the leader on that chain is either Byzantine or hasn’t heard
of the latest blocks on the other chain. As explained in the proof
of Claim 7.1 for every altruistic player, for two chains of roughly
the same length, there’s half a chance that they receive the weaker
chain first due to the unbiasability and uniform distribution of the
random beacon. Thus for an altruistic player there’s half a chance
that they extend the weaker chain.
On the other hand, the stronger chain grows even if the elected
leader received the weaker one first (as long as they are not eligible
on it, which happens with probability 1−1/n). More formally, in the
case where altruistic players are leaders on both chain, the stronger
onewill be extendedwith probability (1−1/n)+1/n·0.5 = 1−0.5·1/n
and the probability that the weaker chain grows is 0.5. Thus it is
more likely for an altruistic player to extend the stronger chain.
This explains why the strongest chain grows with higer probability.
Thus with high probability, there exists a time τ0 such that altru-
istic players will stop extending the weaker chain.
After this time τ0 it is very unlikely that players will revert their
main chain to another chain. Indeed an adversary that tries to revert
the main chain does not succeed except with negligible probability.
Let’s assume that at time τ0, the difference between the main chain
and the chain that the adversary is trying to extend ism. To revert
the chain, they need to create a competitive DAG with at leastm
references within the fork faster than the main chain grows. Asm
gets biggers, the adversary will need to create more blocks privately
and this attack becomes less lilely to succeed as the probability of
creating ℓ blocks privately decreases with ℓ (we will compute this
probability in the proof of the next Theorem 7.4). Here we assume
that the proof-of-delay is secure, i.e. that even an adversary with
enough power will not be able to compute a proof-of-delay faster
than expected.
Finally, as explained in Section 3.3, we must consider long-range
attacks, where an adversary re-writes the history by bribing old
participants. Because we add a decentralized checkpointing, this
attack will not succeed. Let’s assume that an adversary has bought
old keys from previous participants and re-wrote the history of the
blockchain with those. When they receive this new chain, altruistic
players are already aware of at least one second witness block (as
the reconfiguration period has to start after a second witness block
as explained in Section 6.1). According to the betting rule in Sec-
tion 6.1 once altruistic players know of a second witness block, they
will not bet on a block that does not bet on an associated candidate
block. Thus altruistic players will never bet on the new adversarial
chain. This is also true for rational players since when they see
this new chain, they would have to start ignoring all the blocks
they have created in order to bet on it (due to the fourth check
in VerifyBlock), thus losing most of their deposit. Thus the chain
created with old keys will not be accepted by current participants.
We have thus shown that after time τ0, altruistic players have
agreed on the main chain Ck0 and that it’s very unlikley they will
revert to another main chain. This proves the result. □
Next, we show chain quality. Intuitively, this results from the fact
that a player is unlikely to be elected a winner for many consecutive
blocks and that the proof-of-delay is secure.
Theorem 7.4 (Chain qality). A coalition fC < 1/3 of non-
altruistic players cannot contribute to a fraction of more than µ =
fC + α of the blocks in the main chain. Given our choice of values for
the different parameter we have α = 0.03.
Proof. The probability that an adversary controlling nC partici-
pants can contribute one block is 1−(1−p)nC . Thus we have that the
probability that a player contributes exactly ℓ consecutive blocks,
without grinding is (1− (1−p)nC )ℓ(1−p)nC . The expected number
of consecutive blocks is thus
∑∞
j=0 j(1 − (1 − p)nC )j (1 − p)nC =
(1 − p)nC ∑∞j=0 j(1 − (1 − p)nC )j = (1 − p)nC · (1−(1−p)nC )(1−(1−(1−p)nC ))2 =
(1 − p)nC /(1 − (1 − p)nC ). (This is the case where a player re-draw
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the lottery once each time they are elected leaders.) A quick esti-
mation shows that for n big enough the expected number of con-
secutive blocks for a coalition of a third that plays honestly is 0.395.
For a coalition that grinds, the idea is that they will “re-draw” the
lottery for each of their winning shares to try and create more
blocks. The probability of creating a chain of exactly ℓ consecu-
tive blockswhen grinding is
∑
x1, ...,xℓ ∈Sℓ
(nC
x1
)
. . .
(nCxℓ−1
xℓ
)
p
∑
xi (1−
p)n(1+
∑ℓ
i=1 xi )−
∑ℓ
i=1 xi , where Sℓ = {x1, . . . ,xℓ : 1 ≤ x1 ≤ nC ;∀i >
1 1 ≤ xi ≤ xi−1nC}. (This is a sequence of Bernoulli trials where
the number of trials is the number of successes on the previous
round times nC .) Using the above probability, a player that grinds
through all their blocks has an expectation of creating 0.42 blocks.
This gives a value of α = 0.03. We will confirm this value in the sim-
ulation in the next section. We thus see that the advantage gained
by grinding is limited, due to our leader election mechanism. Again,
we assume that the proof-of-delay is secure. □
Finally, we show robustness. The main reason this holds is that,
by following the protocol in betting on the FCR, a block gets more
references and thus has a higher score than a block not following
the protocol. A coalition of players can gain a small advantage by
grinding through all the blocks they can create, but when doing
so they keep their chain private and thus prevent other players
from referencing it. This in turn reduce the rewards associated with
these blocks.
Theorem 7.5 (Robustness). Given the utility function in Equa-
tion 1 and the values for rwd and pun chosen in Section 7.1, following
the protocol is a ϵ-(1/3, 1/4)-robust equilibrium, where ϵ = 1.1.
Proof. In order to get an intuition behind the proof, we first
show that following the protocol is a Nash equilibrium. Recall that
the possible choices when elected leader are: (1) whether to bet or
not, (2) which leaves to include, and (3) when to broadcast their
blocks. We show that for each of these, if other players follow the
protocol then a player is incentivized to follow the protocol. If the
player is elected leader on the FCR, we want to show that betting
on it gives them a higher probability of being a winner. This is be-
cause, by definition of the FCR (Algorithm 6.1), betting on it means
betting on the stronger chain. As argued in Claim 7.1, this will add
more to its score, and thus again by the definition of the FCR it has
a higher probability of being the next block chosen by the FCR. (It
could still, however, lose against another bet on the FCR that has a
smaller hash, but even in this case the Label function still labels it
as neutral.) This establishes (1).
By creating a block on top of a weaker chain, a player needs to
ignore the stronger chain, which means referencing fewer blocks
(i.e., ignoring blocks of which they are aware). This means that their
block will have worse connectivity, however, and thus has a higher
chance of being labelled loser and thus getting a punishment. This
is because, by the definition of the anticone, worse connectivity
means a bigger anticone, which in turns means a bigger intersection
with the blue set and thus, by the definition of Label (Algorithm 6.2),
a higher chance of being labelled loser. This establishes (2).
To argue about (3), we now show why a rational player is incen-
tivized to reveal their block as soon as possible. By broadcasting
their block as soon as they created it, their blocks can get more
references (since other player follow the protocol), which again
increases the probability of being a winner, and the expected accom-
panying reward. (A single player has nothing to grind through.)
Now, in order to show that the protocol is robust, we show that a
coalition of rational players that deviate from the protocol to raise
their utility, can only do so by ϵ (resiliency). We next show that a
Byzantine adversary cannot decreases the utility of honest players
by more than 1/ϵ (immunity).
Resiliency. We consider a coalition of a fraction fC of rational
players. Because it is costless to create blocks, a rational coalition
can clearly gain an advantage by grinding through all the blocks
they can create in order to find a subDAG that increases their utility.
However due to the restrictions imposed by the leader election
and assuming the proof-of-delay is secure the advantage they can
gain is limited. As shown in Theorem 7.4, the expected number of
blocks contributed by an adversary that adopts a grinding strategy
is 0.42 versus 0.39 for a coalition that follows the rule. Rational
participants can thus increase their gain from 0.39c to 0.42c . We
thus achieve ϵ-robustness with ϵ = 0.42/0.39 = 1.077. This results
will be confirmed by the simulations.
Immunity. We need to show that even in the case where a frac-
tion t of players behave completely irrationally, the outcome of
the rest of the players stays unchanged. According to the utility
functions, as defined in Section 6, there are three independant
components to the utility function that an adversary could try to
influence to harm altruistic players: (1) the rwd term (2) the pun
term and (3) the bigpun term. To harm the honest player, an adver-
sary could try: (1) preventing an honest players from contributing
blocks to the main chain; (2)-(3) increasing the number of blocks
from the honest players that gets punished by pun or bigpun. The
adversary cannot incur any bigpun to the altruistic players since
they cannot force them to ignore their own block, thus we only
focus on case (1) and (2). To do (1) an adversary cannot indeed
prevent players from creating blocks but once they produce it, they
can try and create an alternative blockDAG so that the altruistic
player’s block does not make it to the main chain. To do (2), the
adversary could create an alternative blockDAG that does not ref-
erence altruistic players’ blocks to try and incur a punishment to
their blocks. (According to the Label function defined in Section 6
a block gets a punishment if its anticone intersects the blue set
for more than k blocks and a block that has less connections to
other blocks has a bigger anticone.) In both cases the Byzantine
adversary harms a player the most when creating the biggest alter-
native blockDAG that does not reference altruistic players’ blocks.
To incur a punishment to the altruistic players Byzantine play-
ers need to create a subDAG of more than k blocks on their own,
where k is the interconnectivity paramater. Indeed if they do so
then those k blocks will be in the anticone of an altruistic player
that contributed a block at that same time and will be labeled a loser
according to the Label algorithm in Section 6.1. When choosing
k = 3 and using similar probabilities as in Theorem 7.4, one can
compute that the probability of creating a subDAG of more than 3
blocks is (1−p)nC +nC ∗p∗(1−p)2nC−1+
(n
2
)
p2(1−p)3nC−2+(np(1−
p)nC−1)2(1 − p)nC + (nC3 )p3(1 − p)4nC−3 + (nC2 )nCp3(1 − p)3nC−2 +(nC
2
)
2nCp3(1−p)4nC−3+(nCp(1−p)(nC−1))3(1−p)nC . An estimation
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(a) The length of the longest fork, in the presence of a coalition of
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(b) The fraction of winning blocks belonging to altruistic (blue) and
Byzantine (red) players.
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(c) The payoff for altruistic players (blue) and a coalition of rational
players (red).
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(d) The payoff for altruistic players (blue) in the presence of a coali-
tion of Byzantine players (red).
Figure 5: Results from our simulation, averaged over 10 runs and considering up to 50 non-altruistic players (out of a total of 150).
of the previous probability gives 2.5% for an adversary that controls
a third of the player.
This means that 2.5% of the blocks the adversary create can incur
a punishment of pun to another player. Since on average two third
of the players should contribute to two third of the blocks, we have
that a third of Byzantine players will reduce the payoff of the other
players from 67 · c to 67 · c − 2.5 · pun every hundred blocks. With
our numerical value of pun = 6 and c = 1 we have that the payoff
of the other players is reduced by 67/52=1.29. For a coalition of
a quarter the above probability is 1%, bringing the above ratio to
67/61=1.1. With ϵ = 1.1, we conclude that a coalition of one quarter
of Byzantine player cannot harm the others since they cannot cre-
ate an alternative blockDAG with enough advantage. The protocol
is thus ϵ−immune against a coalition of a quarter. This will also be
confirmed by our simulations Section 7.3. □
7.3 Simulations
We next present our simulations, that support and validate the
proofs above. As stated in Section 4, we consider three types of
players: Byzantine, altruistic, and rational. We simulate the game
using different fractions of different types of players. Our simulation
is written in Python, and consists of roughly 1,000 lines of code.
All players start with the same deposit. To model network latency,
we add random delays between the propagation of blocks amongst
players. Following Decker and Wattenhofer [23], this random delay
follow an exponential distribution. Each simulation that we run
has 150 players and lasts for 5,000 time slots. All our results are
averaged over 120 runs of the simulation.
In addition to the balance of the types of players, there are several
different parameters we need to consider: k , the inter-connectivity
parameter; c , the constant in the reward in Equation 1; pun, the
punishment; and bigpun, the big punishment. We chose k = 3,
c = 1, pun = 6, and bigpun = 10. We also define the initial deposit
of all players to be 0, but allow for payoffs to go below zero. We
stress that all these values are relatively arbitrary, as we are more
interested in the ratio between them and their evolution rather than
their specific values. Different parameters do, however, result in
different effects on the protocol. For example, decreasing the value
of the punishment would increase the immunity of the protocol,
but would also weaken its resiliency (since a coalition would be
able to gain a bigger profit). We leave a more in-depth exploration
of this trade-off for future work.
Because we do not use our simulation to support our argument
for the growth of the chain, we do not implement the proof-of-delay
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function discussed at the end of Section 5.1 (as it is crucial only for
liveness).
Stategies. As explained in Section 7.1, the strategy followed by
rational players is to create all the blocks they can privately and
then grind through all the subDAG to find the one that increases
their expected utility and broadcast this subDAG only. For the
Byzantine players, we are interested in capturing the worst type of
adversary in terms of (1) decreasing the payoff of altruistic players
(this will capture the immunity property) and (2) the biggest fork
they can create (to capture the convergence property). We explained
in the proof of Theorem 7.5 that the biggest harm Byzantine players
can incur to altruistic players is by creating the biggest subDAG
possible. Thus we consider Byzantine adversaries that create as
many blocks as possible and broadcast them.
Results. We measured the length of the longest fork; the results
are in Figure 5a. For a maximum number of 49 Byzantine players,
the longest fork is 12 blocks, so the simulation supports our proof
that the protocol converges.
In Figure 5b we see that the maximum fraction of blocks con-
tributed by a fraction of up to one-third of non-altruistic players
is 0.351 compared to an expected contribution of 49/150 = 0.327.
This shows the chain quality property with α = 0.024, meaning
that grinding through all the blocks they are eligible to produce
allows an adversary to contribute 2.4% more blocks on average.
This is consistent with our proof.
For robustness, the results of the simulations are in Figures 5c
and 5d. We see that a coalition of up to one-third of rational players
increases their payoff up to 3.8 compared to 3.5 when not forming a
coalition. We thus achieve ϵ-robustness with ϵ = 1.086. To quantify
the harm that a Byzantine coalition can do to others, we compute
for each simulation the payoff of altruistic players in the case of a
fraction t of Byzantine players trying to harm the players. Figure 5d
shows the payoffs for both altruistic and Byzantine players. We
see that the payoffs of altruistic players is unaffected even in the
presence of a quarter of Byzantine players, but starts decreasing
after the coalition becomes larger. This is why we claim robustness
only for coalitions up to a quarter, but do observe here that the
payoff of the Byzantine coalition is much more negatively affected
than that of the altruistic players. These results are again consistent
with our previous proof.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This paper presented Fantômette, a blockchain-based consensus
protocol composed of two components of potential independent
interest: a leader election protocol, Caucus, and a scheme for in-
centivization. The protocol is secure in a semi-synchronous setting
against a coalition consisting of up to a third of participants, and
achieves finality via the use of decentralized checkpointing.
While Fantômette makes some important first steps in treat-
ing incentives as a first-class concern, there are other avenues to
consider. In terms of evaluation, existing literature analyzing in-
centives in PoW-based systems has used techniques like Markov
Decision Processes [30] or no-regret learning [18] in order to justify
more formally the best rational strategy. These techniques would
be much more difficult to apply in a setting with PoS, but it would
nevertheless be useful to better justify the Byzantine strategy used
in our simulations.
Finally, we currently treat all bets as being of equal value (one
block is one bet), but it may be interesting to consider bets of vari-
able size, in which players that are more confident about the blocks
on which they place bets (for example, because those blocks are
highly connected) could attempt to gain a higher reward by placing
a bet of higher value.
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